Japan and UAP: the Kōno directive and the 2024 parliamentary group
In September 2020, Japan's Ministry of Defense issued a directive on what to do when facing an unidentified aerial object. It was signed by a minister who said he did not believe in them. Four years later, eighty lawmakers asked for an agency.
On September 14, 2020, Japan's Ministry of Defense, headed by Tarō Kōno, made public a directive on how the Self-Defense Forces should act when facing unidentified aerial objects that may pose a risk: record, photograph, report and refer for analysis. It creates no agency or budget. On June 6, 2024, a cross-party parliamentary league was formed in the Diet that asks for a dedicated body and more cooperation with the United States.
Executive summary of the case file. Everything essential before you dig deeper.
Fact sheet
OSINT - Traceability
Friends, today I’m not bringing lights. I’m bringing a procedure. And you already know that a procedure excites me more than a shaky video, because a video gets argued over forever, while a procedure has a date, a letterhead and a man who signed it and who can be questioned in parliament.
On September 14, 2020, Japan’s Ministry of Defense made public a directive on how the Self-Defense Forces should act if they come across an unidentified flying object. The name of the document, in Japanese, translates fairly literally as “UFO response policy.” The minister who pushed it through was Tarō Kōno. And the first thing Kōno did when presenting it was to make clear to reporters that he does not believe in UFOs.
That statement, which in Spain would have made a mocking headline, is in fact the key to reading the whole document. Kōno was not opening an X-File. He was closing an administrative hole.
The verifiable part, first
What is on the record, and well on the record, is this. In April 2020 the U.S. Department of Defense declassified and formally released the three Navy videos that had been circulating on the internet for years. It revealed nothing new. What it did was much worse for the ministries of half the world: it turned into official material something that until then could be dismissed as rumor. From then on, the defense minister of any U.S. ally could be asked at a press conference what protocol his country had. And almost none had one.
Japan didn’t either. In fact, a few months earlier Kōno himself had said publicly that Self-Defense Forces pilots had never encountered anything of the kind. Put another way: there was no caseload, there was no procedure and there was no one to refer the matter to. That is the gap that gets filled in September.
And what the directive says is modest. If Self-Defense Forces personnel observe an unidentified aerial object, they must make sure they cannot identify it, leave a written record, record it graphically as far as possible and send the material on for the corresponding analysis. It also provides for collecting information supplied by civilians. That is all: no new unit, no budget, no office with a plaque on the door.
It is worth stressing, because it is exactly what gets lost when it is translated into a headline. “Japan creates a UFO protocol” suggests a structure. What exists is a procedural directive: a piece of paper that tells a pilot whom to send the photo to. In terms of state apparatus, it is the lowest rung possible. In terms of traceability, it is infinitely more than there was the day before.
The Pentagon releases the three videos
The U.S. Department of Defense formally declassifies FLIR1, Gimbal and GoFast.
Kono answers at a press conference
The minister states that Japanese pilots have never encountered anything like it.
The directive
Defense makes public the policy for responding to unidentified aerial objects.
Source ↗ODNI preliminary assessment
The United States publishes its assessment of twenty-four cases and pushes the issue into institutional territory.
Japanese parliamentary group
A cross-party league on unidentified aerial phenomena is formed in the Diet.
Source ↗What is said to have happened
The version circulating on the international circuit is that Japan “recognized UFOs,” that the Japanese government “is preparing for contact” and that the defense minister ordered his pilots to “chase” anomalous phenomena. I have read all three in headlines from outlets that ought to know how to read a document before summarizing it.
None of that is in the directive. What is there is an elementary chain of custody: I observe, I note, I photograph, I refer. And a threshold criterion that usually gets overlooked and is the most interesting thing of all: the procedure is triggered by objects that may pose a security risk. Not by just any light. By a risk.
Because that is what this is about, rather than extraterrestrial life. Japan has above its head the most contested airspace on the planet per square meter: high-altitude balloons, drones of undeclared origin, aircraft that enter and leave its identification zone several times a week and a neighborhood that does not invite relaxation. An unidentified object, in that context, is an air defense problem with a provisional name, not a curiosity.
What it could be, without needing Martians
A protocol is an answer to an uncomfortable question
We have seen the pattern in this archive so many times that it can almost be predicted. A state does not legislate on aerial phenomena because it has found something. It legislates when the question becomes impossible to dodge in public. It happened in the United Kingdom in 1950, it happened in the United States in 2021 and it happened in Japan in September 2020, about four and a half months after the Pentagon turned three videos into official documents.
Aviation safety is the door everything comes in through
And it is the right one. When this subject enters an institution dressed as a phenomenon, it stays in the curiosities section and dies. When it enters dressed as a risk to air traffic or to sovereign space, it comes in with a budget and an obligation to answer. It is the same door through which it has entered in the United States, pushed open among others by Ryan Graves and his aerospace safety association. Japan has used the same one, and that is why its protocol starts by talking about risk and not about origin.
There is also a comparison that leaves the matter in plain view. Japan’s Joint Staff regularly publishes the numbers of scrambles by its fighters against foreign aircraft approaching its airspace, broken down by country of origin. It is a public, periodic and searchable statistic, and nobody considers it a concession or a scandal: it is administrative routine. In other words, Japan knows perfectly well how to publish a series of sensitive aerial data when it wants to.
Which makes the silence on the other matter a data point in itself. If the unidentified is processed through a channel that produces no statistics, the cases are not what is missing; the output is. And without paper output, a procedure is a promise. Here we have spent years measuring these things in the only way that works, which is counting published documents, and in this box the counter is still at zero.
And yet, an uncomfortable precedent
There is a detail that makes all this a little sharper. When Kōno said that Japanese pilots had never come across anything similar, he was talking about the Self-Defense Forces. But the best-documented aerial case in the history of Japanese civil aviation happened in 1986, when a Japan Air Lines cargo plane reported an object during a flight over Alaska and the episode ended up generating a full case file in the U.S. administration. We have it right here: JAL 1628, with the testimony of John Callahan, of the FAA, on top of it.
The captain of that flight, Kenju Terauchi, was taken off international flying after he spoke. That comes from what he himself maintained and what the press of the time reported, not from legend. Thirty-four years later, his country’s Ministry of Defense published a directive so that anyone who saw something could report it without trouble. That arc, from tacit sanction to written procedure, is the whole history of the subject in one paragraph.
Four years later, the Diet
On June 6, 2024, a cross-party league devoted to unidentified aerial phenomena was formed in the Japanese Parliament. It is chaired by former Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada, and Shinjirō Koizumi serves as secretary general. It brings together more than eighty legislators from different parties, including several former defense officials, and its central request is specific: that the government create a dedicated body for collection and analysis, and that it deepen cooperation with the United States on the matter.
When eighty lawmakers sign something, what moves them is someone explaining that having no data also has a price, not a light they have seen.
Note the framing they chose to present it, because it is identical to the American one and that is no coincidence: they did not talk about extraterrestrial life, they said these objects could be surveillance drones or weapons, and that for that reason they cannot be ruled out without analysis. It is the argument of costly ignorance, and it is the only one that has managed to move institutions in the last ten years. No chamber in the world has approved anything out of cosmic curiosity.
A geographic argument was also cited when the group was presented. According to the press that covered the event, a report by the U.S. AARO placed the strip running from western Japan toward China among the areas with the highest concentration of reports. I note it as attributed, because I have not read that map in the original document and this archive distinguishes between what a paper says and what a news account says about a paper. We have the AARO reports on file: the 2024 annual report and the historical report.
Why this matters
Because it is proof that the model can be exported. For seventy years this subject was, institutionally, an Anglo-American affair with French and South American annexes. What has happened since 2020 is that the aviation safety framework has proved translatable: it works just as well in English, French and Japanese, because it appeals to no belief, it appeals to a gap in surveillance. Japan has copied the framework, not the conclusions.
Because Japan also contributes something neither the United States nor Europe has: a context in which unidentified objects have very concrete and very uncomfortable earthly candidates. When a Japanese ministry receives a report of something strange over the sea, the first hypothesis is a neighbor, not a visitor. That forces a rigor that is optional in other latitudes.
And because the pending work remains, the usual kind. A 2020 directive and a 2024 parliamentary league have not produced, as of September 2026 and as far as can be checked from outside, a single public case report. There is no database, no annual statistic, no Japanese document equivalent to those published by the U.S. office. There is procedure and there is parliamentary will. What is missing is the paper output, which is the only thing this archive can file.
Meanwhile, the honest thing is to say what exists: one country has decided that its pilots should write down what they cannot identify and send it to someone. It sounds like little. It is what the Spanish Air Force (Ejército del Aire) had already been doing since the 1960s, with investigating judges (jueces informadores) and one file per case. The difference is that Spain took decades to open that archive, and when it did, almost two thousand folios came out. Japan still lacks the second half.
A minister who does not believe in UFOs signing a procedure about UFOs. If you are looking for an image of how this subject enters a modern state, look no further: this is it. No mystery, no epic and with a registration number.
OSINT – Source traceability
The AARO map claim is expressly attributed to press coverage of the event and not to a direct reading of the report. The Japanese ministry's URL is not cited because it returns a 403 to automated requests and I have not been able to verify its content. I avoid attributing to the directive powers it does not have.